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Supreme Court Contend with Evidence of
Prosecutors’ Efforts to Circumvent Batson v.
Kentucky
IAN A. MANCE*
ABSTRACT
This Article considers ongoing litigation in State v. Tucker, a case currently before the Supreme Court of North Carolina, involving prosecutors’
use of peremptory challenges to secure an all-white jury in a capital trial
involving a Black defendant. The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I
contends that prosecutors’ surreptitious use of a “cheat sheet” that recited
“justifications” for peremptory challenges in Tucker’s capital trial evidences their intent to discriminate against him and the Black members of
the venire. Part II critiques the N.C. Attorney General’s decision to defend
the trial prosecutors’ use of the document. Part II, Section A argues that
his office’s response to Tucker has exposed limitations of its commitment to
addressing the issues identified by the N.C. Task Force on Racial Equity
and Criminal Justice, which he co-chaired. Part II, Section B argues that
ending racial discrimination in jury selection in North Carolina will require
the Office of the Attorney General to demonstrate that there are limits to
the conduct it will defend on appeal. Part III considers the arguments advanced by the Attorney General in response to the allegations raised in
Tucker’s petition. Part III, Section A discusses the growing recognition of
exceptions to procedural bars that might otherwise prohibit courts from
considering evidence of racial discrimination in jury selection. Part III,
Section B argues that the equal protection doctrine does not permit prosecutors to employ devices designed to undermine the operation of
*

Ian A. Mance is an attorney at Emancipate NC, a nonprofit civil rights organization based
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3

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2022

1

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 1

4

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:3

mechanisms imposed by courts to guard against racial discrimination. Part
III, Section C discusses unique considerations regarding the adjudication
of homicide cases involving Black defendants in North Carolina and argues
that courts should closely scrutinize claims of racial discrimination in the
jury selection process in such cases.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of North Carolina is expected to soon hear arguments in State v. Tucker, a capital case from Forsyth County that is likely
to be one of the most consequential cases for racial justice to be heard this
term. Russell William Tucker, a Black man, was convicted of murder by
an all-white jury for a 1994 shooting at a Kmart in Winston-Salem and was
sentenced to death.1 Earlier this year, the court granted his petition for a
writ of certiorari to consider arguments that prosecutors in his trial violated
Batson v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark case on racial discrimination in jury selection, when they struck every Black member from
his prospective jury.
Among other evidence, Tucker’s lawyers have offered a Michigan
State University study indicating that the State discriminated on the basis of
race in selecting his jury. Buttressing their claim is a document discovered
in prosecutors’ files years after Tucker’s trial, known colloquially as the
“cheat sheet,”2 which contains a prewritten list of what it describes as “Batson justifications.” The justifications, or excuses, appear to have been designed for prosecutors to offer in the event defense counsel challenged a
peremptory strike as racially based. The document recites purportedly raceneutral reasons for insulating strikes of Black jurors from defense challenges, including that jurors had poor “body language,” were “monosyllabic,” or gave off an “air of defiance.”3 In Tucker’s case, the text of the
document mirrors language and rationales offered by prosecutors in response to the defense’s Batson objections during voir dire at his trial.4
Three and a half decades after Batson, North Carolina sits alone among
its sister states in the Fourth Circuit, having never reversed a conviction on

1. State v. Tucker, 490 S.E.2d 559, 560–61 (N.C. 1997); Michael Hewlett, Death-Row
Inmate Says Prosecutors Excluded Black Jurors in His Case, Two Others in Forsyth County,
WINSTON-SALEM J. (Feb. 25, 2020), https://journalnow.com/news/local/death-row-inmatesays-prosecutors-excluded-black-jurors-in-his-case-two-others-in-forsyth/article_8bf58f034981-5aa0-b13e-9c001a2a3f2a.html [https://perma.cc/6NNJ-HKLZ].
2. See, e.g., State v. Augustine, 847 S.E.2d 729, 732 (N.C. 2020) (discussing “use of a
prosecutorial ‘cheat sheet’ to respond to Batson objections”); Jacob Biba, Did Prosecutors
Use a ‘Cheat Sheet’ to Strike Black Jurors in North Carolina Death Penalty Case?, THE
APPEAL (Sept. 4, 2018), https://theappeal.org/did-prosecutors-use-a-cheat-sheet-to-strikeblack-jurors-in-north-carolina-death-penalty-case/ [https://perma.cc/9ZMG-HFA5].
3. Top Gun II, Batson Justifications: Articulating Juror Negatives, https://www.nci
ds.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/BatsonJustification.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK38-TT8
Z].
4. See Defendant-Appellant’s Brief at 2–3, 16–19, 34–35, State v. Tucker, No.
113A96-4 (N.C. July 15, 2021), cert. granted, 856 S.E.2d 103 (N.C. 2021) (mem.) (comparing the document with the voir dire transcript).
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the grounds that prosecutors engaged in race-based juror discrimination.
While study after study has identified the issue as an enduring problem in
the state, remedies for defendants impacted by the practice have remained
elusive. The strong evidence of pretextual, race-based challenges in Russell
Tucker’s case at once offers the court an opportunity to breathe life into
Batson in North Carolina and to rebuke the use of unethical practices in jury
selection.
Factual similarities to other capital cases on appeal suggest the upcoming decision could have consequences beyond those to Russell Tucker. The
prosecutors involved in Tucker’s case have tried multiple capital cases in
Forsyth County, and the document in question was distributed at a seminar
attended by approximately two dozen of their colleagues. One judge who
examined the cheat sheet issue in the context of the short-lived Racial Justice Act litigation concluded it had been used to circumvent Batson in the
Cumberland County case of Tilmon Golphin.5 Evidence suggests it was
also used in the case of Robbie Lyons, a Black man convicted of murder
and sentenced in Forsyth County by a jury from which prosecutors struck
the majority of the prospective Black jurors.6 Lyons was represented at trial
by a real estate lawyer and was executed in 2003.
I.

PROSECUTORS’ USE OF A CHEAT SHEET DESIGNED TO CIRCUMVENT
BATSON V. KENTUCKY CONSTITUTES EVIDENCE OF THEIR INTENT TO
DISCRIMINATE AGAINST RUSSELL TUCKER AND THE BLACK PROSPECTIVE
JURORS ON HIS PANEL
Recognizing that “[s]election procedures that purposefully exclude
black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of
our system of justice,”7 the U.S. Supreme Court, in the landmark case Batson v. Kentucky, “sought to protect the rights of defendants and jurors, and
to enhance public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.”8
Batson held that a defendant who is a member of a cognizable racial group
can establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in his or her jury
selection process by showing that a prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against a venire member of the defendant’s race, and that facts and
circumstances raise an inference that the prospective jurors were
5. State v. Golphin, No. 97 CRS 47314-15, at 73–77 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012)
(order granting mots. for appropriate relief).
6. Defendant-Appellant’s Brief, supra note 4, at 11; Hewlett, Prosecutors Excluded
Black Jurors, supra note 1.
7. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
8. State v. Ramseur, 843 S.E.2d 106, 117 (N.C. 2020) (quoting Flowers v. Mississippi,
139 S. Ct. 2228, 2242 (2019)).
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“exclude[d] . . . from the petit jury on account of their race.”9 If the trial
court finds that the defendant has made the requisite showing, the burden
shifts to the prosecutor to “articulate a [race] neutral explanation related to
the particular case to be tried,” after which the trial court must “determine
if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.”10 Crucially,
Batson obligates prosecutors to be subjectively honest about their reasons
for striking prospective jurors.11 When responding to a Batson challenge
during voir dire, prosecutors are expected to give a truthful answer as to
why they moved to strike a prospective juror.12
As Professor Pamela Karlan has explained, “the Batson rule is to a
great extent hortatory in the same way that the ban on selective enforcement
is: much of its effectiveness in the real world depends . . . on its internalization by the relevant actors.”13 In Russell Tucker’s case, there is little mystery about what prosecutors thought of their responsibilities vis-à-vis Batson: the record indicates they recited prewritten excuses from the “Batson
justifications” document to obscure their actual motivations.14 The nature
of what the document implies about their intentions, as well as the context
in which it was used and the racial stereotypes it recalls, all amount to evidence that prosecutors acted consciously to deny Tucker his right to a constitutionally-drawn jury.
As Tucker’s appellate attorneys at the Center for Death Penalty Litigation explained in their main brief to the court:
The all-white jury that tried Mr. Tucker for his life in 1996 was selected by
Forsyth County Assistant District Attorneys Rob Lang and David Spence,
both white men. A few months before the trial, Lang attended a CLE for
North Carolina prosecutors, where he was given a handout titled “Batson
Justifications: Articulating Juror Negatives” . . . During jury selection, Mr.
Tucker’s prosecutors exercised peremptory strikes against all five of the
9. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
10. Id. at 98.
11. See Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 50
STAN. L. REV. 9, 36 (1997) (observing that the U.S. Supreme Court has “concentrated its
determination of discriminatory intent on the prosecutor’s subjective state of mind,” and that
“the ultimate question is one of subjective honesty, not objective sensibility”).
12. See State v. Hobbs, 841 S.E.2d 492, 503 (N.C. 2020) (remanding for further consideration of prosecutor’s motive for striking prospective juror where the “Court of Appeals . . .
bas[ed] its conclusion on the fact that the reasons articulated by the State have, in other cases,
been accepted as race-neutral”).
13. Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 2001, 2023 (1998).
14. Cf. State v. Robinson, 846 S.E.2d 711, 717 (N.C. 2020) (“The trial court noted that
. . . ‘North Carolina prosecutors received training in 1995 and 2011 about how to circumvent Batson.’”).
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qualified Black venire members, leaving Mr. Tucker, who is Black, to be
tried by an all-white jury. When confronted with repeated Batson objections, the prosecutors used [the] list of prefabricated, racially offensive reasons to defend these strikes. They gave other reasons that were either false
or applied equally to white jurors they accepted. For example, Mr. Tucker’s
prosecutors struck one Black juror for “lacking a stake in the community”
even though she lived, raised children, and worked in Forsyth County her
entire life. They claimed they struck Black jurors for being unregistered to
vote, but accepted numerous white jurors who were likewise not registered.
They offered absurd reasons for striking Black jurors, for example, complaining that a Black juror was “monosyllabic” when answering mostly
yes-or-no questions . . . . Finally, the prosecutors deliberately destroyed
their copies of the jury questionnaires, and they admitted on the record that
their aim was to prevent Mr. Tucker from ever knowing the content of their
notes.15

Bryan Stevenson, Executive Director of the Equal Justice Initiative,
explained in an affidavit affixed to Tucker’s Motion for Appropriate Relief
why he regards the cheat sheet as compelling evidence of an intent to discriminate:
On its face, the Batson Justifications handout is not a document that is intended to help prosecutors pick a jury in a race-neutral way. The title says
it all. Prosecutors must provide “Batson justifications” and “articulate juror
negatives,” not when making strike decisions, but only at Batson’s second
step, once an objection has been lodged and typically, once the judge has
found a prima facie case of discrimination. Thus, the document is a list of
reasons to be used once an inference of discrimination has been raised to
prevent the judge from making a finding of purposeful discrimination. This
purpose is at odds with the proper function of Batson’s second step, which
is for the prosecutor to provide her true subjective reasons for striking the
juror. If a prosecutor chooses instead to give reasons suggested by the
handout, this is the very definition of pretext and strong evidence that her
unspoken, subjective reasons were impermissibly race-conscious.16

Others have observed that the document, although written to sound
race-neutral, is steeped in racial stereotypes. In a separate affidavit offered
in support of Russell Tucker, Dr. Ibram X. Kendi, a prominent historian on
race in America, explained that the document echoes historic characterizations of Blacks as unintelligent, defiant or hostile, unwilling to make eye

15. Defendant-Appellant’s Brief, supra note 4, at 8, 14–15.
16. Amend. to Mot. for Appropriate Relief Based on Newly Discovered Evid. & Second
Amend. to Mot. for Appropriate Relief Pursuant to the Racial Justice Act at 17, ¶ 11, State
v. Tucker, No. 94-CRS-40465 (N.C. Super. Ct. Forsyth Cnty. June 4, 2019) (Affidavit of
Bryan Stevenson) [hereinafter Stevenson Affidavit].
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contact, and physically unattractive.17 Mr. Stevenson, too, has noted that
“phrases like those in the North Carolina handout are rooted in historically
derogatory labels applied to African Americans who did not show adequate
deference to the prevailing racial order[,]” and that “[a]s such, these justifications are not truly race-neutral, in that they have a much different and
more insidious meaning when applied to African Americans.”18
When viewed in the context in which it was employed, the document
amounts to evidence of racial discrimination in Tucker’s jury selection process.19 The transcripts from voir dire and the fact that the document was
discovered in the prosecutors’ case file indicate that the justifications offered to the trial court for striking the Black jurors were pretextual, something the U.S. Supreme Court has said “naturally gives rise to an inference
of discriminatory intent.”20 This inference appears to be confirmed by statistics that indicate Forsyth County prosecutors, between 1990 and 2010,
were more than twice as likely to strike eligible venirepersons if they were
Black,21 and that Tucker’s prosecutor, David Spence, had a strike rate “disparity much higher than the state or county average.”22
II. THE N.C. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DEFENSE OF THE BATSON CHEAT
SHEET COINCIDES WITH HIS LEADERSHIP ON A TASK FORCE THAT
IDENTIFIED RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION AS AN
OBSTACLE TO RACIAL EQUITY IN THE STATE’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
Russell Tucker asked the Supreme Court of North Carolina for review
of his Batson claims in the fall of 2020. His petition coincided with a national reckoning on race and criminal justice, spurred by the murder of
George Floyd by a police officer in Minneapolis, that brought 20 million
people into the streets in the largest public demonstrations for racial justice

17. Amend. to Mot. for Appropriate Relief Based on Newly Discovered Evid. and Second Amend. to Mot. for Appropriate Relief Pursuant to the Racial Justice Act at 20–25, ¶¶
6–22, State v. Tucker, No. 94-CRS-40465 (N.C. Super. Ct. Forsyth Cnty. June 4, 2019) (Affidavit of Ibram X. Kendi).
18. Stevenson Affidavit, supra note 16, at 18, ¶ 13.
19. Cf. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240–253 (2005) (concluding that prosecutors
violated Batson where, inter alia, training materials advocated racially based strikes).
20. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 485 (2008).
21. Defendant-Appellant’s Brief at App. 215, 223 ¶ 31, State v. Tucker, No. 113A96-4
(N.C. July 15, 2021), cert. granted, 856 S.E.2d 103 (N.C. 2021) (Affidavit of Catherine
Grosso and Barbara O’Brien) [hereinafter Grosso & O’Brien Affidavit].
22. Defendant-Appellant’s Brief, supra note 4, at 12; see Grosso & O’Brien Affidavit,
supra note 21, at App. 237, tbl.10.
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in American history.23 The protests, which gripped North Carolina’s capital
city of Raleigh for more than a month, prompted the state’s Governor to
convene a task force charged with addressing racial inequities in the state’s
criminal justice system.24 Josh Stein, N.C.’s Democratic Attorney General,
and Anita Earls, a former civil rights attorney and current Associate Justice
on the state’s Supreme Court, were named as its co-chairs.25
In December 2020, the task force issued its final report, identifying and
making recommendations on a variety of issues, including eliminating racial disparities in the courts and promoting racial equity post-conviction.
One of its key takeaways was that “the discretion that prosecutors have can
be a powerful tool to promote a more equitable criminal justice system.”26
Many of the report’s proposals centered on equity and fairness of process
as a core prosecutorial value, as opposed to maximizing convictions.27
Among other things, the task force identified race-based exclusion from
jury service as a key obstacle to equity in the criminal system.28 Enforcement of the prohibition against it remains elusive even today, the group
wrote, because of “covert traditions and practices of discriminatory exclusion” by prosecutors.29 The report argued for the “continued need to pursue
representative juries in North Carolina,” made recommendations to
“strengthen the Batson standard” in the state, and cautioned that a failure to
act risked degrading public trust in the criminal justice system.30

23. Anna Nawaz & Saher Khan, How This Year’s Antiracism Protests Differ from Past
Social Justice Movements, PBS NEWS HOUR (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/what-is-unprecedented-about-this-years-racial-justice-protests [https://perma.cc/
N252-L4YS].
24. Danielle Battaglia, Cooper Signs 3 Laws Focused on Police Accountability, but Says
NC Needs to Go Further, NEWS & OBSERVER (Sept. 3, 2021), https://www.newsobserver.co
m/news/politics-government/article253945323.html [https://perma.cc/K4ZJ-8264].
25. N.C. TASK FORCE FOR RACIAL EQUITY IN CRIM. JUST., REPORT 2020 1 (2020).
26. Id. at 97.
27. In this respect, the report embodied the oft-quoted maxim that a State’s “interest . . .
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” Berger
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8
cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2001) (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice
and not simply that of an advocate.”). Justice Sotomayor, herself a former prosecutor, recently expounded on this idea, writing that States’ attorneys fall short of this responsibility
and “do a grave disservice to the people in whose name they litigate, when they permit themselves to enjoy unfair trial advantages at defendants’ expense.” Kaur v. Maryland, No.
19-1045, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2020) (Sotomayor, J., statement respecting the denial of
cert.).
28. N.C. TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 100.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 100–01.
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Perhaps most surprisingly, given the efforts of the Attorney General
and his attorneys outside of the task force to defeat claims brought by death
row prisoners under the now-repealed Racial Justice Act,31 the report called
for the legislature to reinstate the law.32 Casting the matter in stark and
moral terms, it characterized North Carolina’s death penalty as racist and
argued that the State “prioritizes executions for cases with white victims
and relies on the sentencing verdicts of juries, many of which have been
all-white, that violate constitutional rules regarding jury selection.”33
A. The Attorney General’s Response to the Grant of Certiorari in
Tucker Exposes Limitations of his Office’s Commitment to
Addressing the Issues Identified by the Racial Equity Task Force
Five months after the report was issued, a grant of certiorari put one
“covert practice of discriminatory exclusion” squarely before the state’s supreme court: Forsyth prosecutors’ use of the Batson cheat sheet during the
voir dire that produced the all-white jury that sentenced Russell Tucker to
death. The Office of the N.C. Attorney General, responsible for “defend[ing] all actions in the appellate division in which the State shall be
interested,” including “any cause or matter, civil or criminal, in which the
State may be a party,”34 soon made clear it intended to defend trial prosecutors’ use of the document.

31. See, e.g., Bobby Allyn, N.C. Supreme Court Hears Arguments on Racial Bias in
Death Penalty Cases, NPR (Aug. 26, 2019, 5:35 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/26/7544
10571/n-c-supreme-court-hears-arguments-on-racial-bias-in-death-penalty-cases [https://pe
rma.cc/2GH3-ZC8T] (“In legal filings to the state’s high court, the North Carolina Attorney
General’s Office argued that a lower court acted appropriately when all of the claims under
the Racial Justice Act were voided following the law’s repeal.”). The Racial Justice Act
(RJA), passed by North Carolina’s General Assembly in 2009 and repealed in 2013, allowed
death row prisoners to be sentenced to life imprisonment if, inter alia, a court found evidence
that race played a significant role in the jury selection process through the prosecution’s use
of peremptory strikes. Following the law’s repeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
held that retroactive application of the RJA repeal violated the prohibition on ex post facto
laws and thus those who had filed claims when the RJA was on the books were entitled to
pursue them despite its repeal. See generally In Landmark Decision, North Carolina Supreme Court Strikes Down Retroactive Application of Racial Justice Act Repeal, A.B.A.
(July 23, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_representation/project_press/2020/summer/north-carolina-strikes-retro-application-of-rja-repeal/ [ht
tps://perma.cc/P48H-FPVX].
32. N.C. TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 110. Justice Anita Earls, who co-chaired the
task force with Attorney General Stein, “took no part in the discussion or vote on this recommendation.” Id. at 110 n.105.
33. Id. at 110.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 114-2(1) (West 2021).
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In legal filings, the office has aligned itself with the position of the
N.C. Conference of District Attorneys, which maintains that defense lawyers have misrepresented the document as a cheat sheet meant to circumvent Batson.35 While many of the arguments on paper have focused on persuading the court that consideration of the matter should be procedurally
barred,36 the office has also offered a substantive defense, asserting that,
rather than “establishing any sort of intent to discriminate on the basis of
race,” the document simply “establishes that the prosecutors in Tucker’s
case were aware . . . that all peremptory challenges should appropriately be
based on non-racial reasons.”37 Given what is known both about Tucker’s
trial prosecutors,38 and the extent to which prosecutors in general have
worked to distance themselves from the document,39 this is difficult to credit
as a good faith argument.40 The Attorney General’s decision to make it in
a capital case involving a Black defendant and an all-white jury suggests
real limitations to his office’s professed commitment to racial justice.

35. See Elizabeth Weill-Greenberg, The Persistent History of Excluding Black Jurors in
North Carolina, THE APPEAL (Aug. 26, 2019), https://theappeal.org/north-carolina-black-jur
y-selection/ [https://perma.cc/BB77-G4SH].
36. See generally Part III, Section A, infra, for a discussion of procedural bars in cases
involving racial discrimination.
37. Answer to Successive M.A.R. and State’s Mot. for Summ. Denial at 13, State v.
Tucker, No. 94 CRS 40465 (N.C. Super. Ct. Forsyth Cnty. May 25, 2018); Biba, supra note
2. Shortly before this article went to publication, the Office of the Attorney General filed its
final brief in the case.
38. A study conducted by researchers at Michigan State University concluded that “on
average, Forsyth prosecutors struck Black venire members at 2.25 times the rate of other
prospective jurors and that across four Forsyth County capital trials, Mr. Tucker’s trial prosecutor [David] Spence struck Black jurors with even greater disparity: 3.1 times the rate of
whites.” Defendant-Appellant’s Brief, supra note 4, at 43; see also Hewlett, supra note 1
(“The N.C. Court of Appeals found that [Tucker’s prosecutor David] Spence discriminated
against potential black jurors [in a separate] case[.]”).
39. One North Carolina court concluded that a prosecutor who testified that she had not
attended the “Top Gun II” training, where the “Batson justifications” document was distributed, had in fact attended. The court described the prosecutor as “insolent” when questioned
about her attendance. It also determined that the transcripts from her voir dire in a series of
cases amounted to “very convincing evidence that [she] used the . . . handout when addressing the trial judge” in “a calculated—and largely successful—effort to circumvent Batson.”
State v. Golphin, No. 97 CRS 47314-15, at 73–77 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012) (order
granting mots. for appropriate relief); see also discussion infra note 104.
40. See Girardeau A. Spann, Good Faith Discrimination, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
585, 617 (2015) (“[G]ood faith requires honesty in fact, which would presumably preclude
someone from arguing that an action was intended to advance the goal of racial equality
when it was actually intended to undermine that goal.” (footnote omitted)).
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Given his recent stewardship of a report about the continued salience
of race in jury selection,41 it had seemed conceivable that North Carolina
could join a growing list of jurisdictions where officials have stipulated to
prosecutorial wrongdoing and the need for a new trial in cases in which a
Batson violation was evident from the record.42 In interviews, Stein described 2020 as “a critical moment,” one where there was “widespread
recognition that Black people and White people have not been treated the
same by our criminal justice system.”43 The task force identified many inequities, he said, but also solutions, and as its co-chair, he bore a responsibility “to get these things put into operation.”44 So far, however, that has
largely meant lending his support to the handful of legislative reforms identified by the task force that are capable of gaining majority support in North
Carolina’s conservative General Assembly,45 a result that has left advocates
underwhelmed.46
Stein’s response to Tucker also suggests an unwillingness to retrospectively address issues identified in the report. Tucker is not the first time this
term that the Attorney General’s office has offered a substantive defense of

41. See generally N.C. TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 100.
42. See, e.g., People v. Morant, No. 4904/1995, slip op. at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 10,
2020) (“Over 20 years after defendants . . . were convicted in separate trials, the same jury
discrimination ‘cheat sheet’ . . . was discovered in the People’s files for both cases . . . . As
a result of these disturbing revelations, the People, represented by the Conviction Integrity
Unit . . . , and the defense jointly move[d] to vacate both defendants’ judgments of conviction.”); State’s Stipulations in Response to Defendant’s Presentation of Evidence of Discrimination in Jury Selection on Remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court at 2, State v. Williams, No. 508-604 E (La. Crim. Dist. Ct. June 15, 2017) (stipulating that “the Defendant is
entitled to a new trial due to the State’s use of peremptory strikes against African-American
prospective jurors” and highlighting the District Attorney’s Office recognition of “the need
to redress instances of racial discrimination in the criminal legal system,” including the necessity of “correct[ing] past harms and injustices the office has caused”).
43. Jonathan Limehouse, Can Racial Bias Be Rooted Out of the State’s Criminal Justice
System? A Conversation with N.C. Attorney General Josh Stein, QCITYMETRO (Jan. 26,
2021), https://qcitymetro.com/2021/01/26/a-conversation-with-n-c-attorney-general-josh-st
ein-about-racial-bias-in-courts-and-law-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/34G5-4WWY].
44. Id.
45. See Press Release, Roy Cooper, Governor of North Carolina, Governor Cooper
Signs Criminal Justice Reform Bills Into Law (Sept. 2, 2021), https://governor.nc.gov/news/press-releases/20210/09/02/governor-cooper-signscriminal-justice-reform
-bills-law [https://perma.cc/FFX6-TAY7].
46. See, e.g., Travis Fain, Governor Signs Police Reforms Into Law, WRAL (Sept. 2,
2021, 4:38 PM) https://www.wral.com/governor-signs-police-reforms-into-law/19855489/
[https://perma.cc/P4C7-4PS6] (“Dawn Blagrove, head of Emancipate NC, called the bill ‘a
very, very small step,’ and she credited activists and protestors for creating a political climate
that made it clear politicians couldn’t ignore these issues.”).
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a practice that the task force criticized as racially discriminatory.47 Activists
have continued to press him to support remedies for those convicted in trials
tainted by racial discrimination,48 noting he has shown a willingness to act
boldly on a variety of environmental, consumer, and health issues.49 Their
efforts have thus far been largely unavailing, although a curious September
2021 filing in State v. White, a non-capital homicide case of some notoriety,
may provide some indication that the office is listening.50

47. In a series of cases argued on November 10, 2021, the Office asked the court to
overturn an opinion from the N.C. Court of Appeals that held unconstitutional the imposition
of de facto life without parole sentences for juveniles who courts have determined to be
redeemable. See generally State v. Kelliher, 854 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 2021) (order granting
discretionary review); State v. Anderson, 853 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. 2021) (order granting writ
of supersedeas); State v. Conner, 853 S.E.2d 824 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2020), notice of
appeal filed, No. 64A21 (N.C. Feb. 4, 2021). The task force characterized such sentences as
“concentrated in a small number of North Carolina counties and . . . plagued by racial disparities.” N.C. TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 80.
48. See, e.g., Virginia Bridges, “Make Your Deeds Match Your Words,” Racial Justice
Group Tells N.C. Attorney General Stein, NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.
newsobserver.com/news/local/crime/article250307119.html.
49. Elaine S. Povich, When a State Attorney General Takes On a National Fight, What’s
He Gunning For?, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS: STATELINE (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.pewt
rusts.org/nb/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/11/11when-a-state-attorney-general-takes-on-a-national-fight-whats-he-gunning-for [https://perma.cc/ZJP7-NJHV] (highlighting that national publications have noted Stein’s willingness to speak out on issues on
which others have demurred and described him as “emblematic of a new kind of state attorney general,” one “whose activism stands out, even among his peers”).
50. In State v. White, the N.C. Court of Appeals determined that while it was “apparent
that race was a predominant factor in [the prosecutor’s] decision to strike [two people] from
the venire,” the defendant was not entitled to relief, because the “[d]efense counsel’s failure
to raise the issue of pretext . . . stymied [the] inquiry, and . . . left . . . the narrow question of
whether the trial court was patently wrong[.]” State v. White, 509 S.E.2d 462, 466 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1998). The court concluded it was not and that, on appeal, it was “bound by the tremendous deference accorded the trial court’s determination regarding racial neutrality and
purposeful discrimination.” Id. at 467. In a September 2021 brief to the court, filed in response to a petition for writ of certiorari from White, the Attorney General’s office conceded
his “petition should be granted for the limited purpose of remanding the case to the Superior
Court, Forsyth County for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of Petitioner’s Batson argument.” State’s Response to Petition for Writ of Cert. at 6, State v. White, No. P21-244 (N.C.
App. Sept. 13, 2021). The office further wrote that, “[a]lthough the trial court correctly
found that the procedural bars N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1419(a)(1) and (a)(2) applied, the State
concludes that under the unique factual and procedural circumstances presented, application
of the bar in this specific case would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. It
noted the State had “considered its position carefully, and [did] not lightly request remand
for a new hearing of an otherwise procedurally barred MAR claim.” Id. at 11.
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B. Ending Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection in North Carolina
Will Require the Office of the Attorney General to Demonstrate
That There Are Limits to the Conduct It Will Defend on Appeal
When asked about the seeming inconsistency between criticizing prosecutorial practices in the report and then later asking courts to excuse those
practices on appeal, Stein said that his “statutory duty is to defend the
State.”51 However, the public record suggests this duty to defend is much
more apt to be invoked in the context of criminal cases. The Attorney General pointedly refused to pursue appeals in defense of voting laws and general statutes that he regarded as discriminatory.52 Although he has leveled
strong critiques against “the grotesque racial disparities that manifest in so
many ways in our criminal justice system,”53 a survey of attorneys handling
criminal appeals throughout his first term did not uncover any examples of
his office stipulating to prosecutorial wrongdoing, or the appropriateness of
judicial review, in a case that raised a claim of racial discrimination.54

51. Tested: Racial Injustice and Law Enforcement, WUNC N.C. PUB. RADIO (Apr. 20,
2021), https://www.wunc.org/podcast/tested-podcast/2021-04-20/racial-injustice-and-law-e
nforcement-attorney-general-josh-stein-dawn-blagrove [https://perma.cc/F4L3-JJH5].
52. The Attorney General regarded North Carolina’s infamous, omnibus voter law as
racially discriminatory and declined to pursue an appeal that could have resurrected it. See
generally Michael Hewlett, Voter ID Case: Gov. Cooper, Attorney General Stein Withdrawing from Appeal to U.S. Supreme Court, WINSTON-SALEM J. (Feb. 21, 2017), https://journalnow.com/news/local/voter-id-case-gov-cooper-attorney-general-stein-withdrawing-fromappeal-to-u-s-supreme/article_278cd95a-db59-544f-b4b6-d362991ff8ea.html [https://perm
a.cc/ES6W-UA5F]. In 2021, the General Assembly relieved him as counsel on a separate
voting rights case because of his refusal to appeal an order striking down disenfranchisement
laws that were held to be racially discriminatory. See generally Gary D. Robertson, GOP
Lawmakers Hire Private Lawyer for Voting Rights Suit, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 24, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/voting-voting-rights-ace6e2a80d1742b0ba534e4c218a4276 [htt
ps://perma.cc/2KZ5-EZJH]. He similarly refused to defend a statutory prohibition on samesex domestic violence protection orders that he considered to be unconstitutional. Tested:
Racial Injustice and Law Enforcement, supra note 51. These decisions invited considerable
attention and scorn from the legislators who passed the laws. They also implicated the majority of North Carolina’s General Assembly in acts of discrimination, something the Attorney General’s criminal division has seemed reticent to do when the ethics of District Attorneys have been called into question.
53. N.C. TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 1.
54. See Emancipate N.C., Open Letter to Josh Stein (Mar. 30, 2021), https://emancipate
nc.org/open-letter-to-josh-stein/ [https://perma.cc/HHZ8-Y4H9] (“An informal survey of
North Carolina attorneys who do criminal appeals did not uncover any examples during
Stein’s tenure of his criminal division supporting the dismissal of charges on account of
police or prosecutorial misconduct, although it did identify a few cases where the office felt
judges or defense attorneys had dropped the ball in a way that might warrant relief.”). The
recent filing in State v. White, discussed supra note 50, stipulated to the need for an
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These stipulations can be necessary for courts to even have the opportunity
to review unpreserved issues.55
In Tucker, Stein’s decision to defend the actions of the trial prosecutors
stands in contrast to decisions of officials elsewhere who have stipulated to
the existence of wrongdoing and the necessity of a new trial when prosecutors clearly relied on unethical practices to circumvent Batson.56 It also
comes at a time when a number of states are taking action to address the
kind of dishonest practices in jury selection at issue in Tucker’s case.57
Among them is California, where a survey of materials used to train prosecutors recently determined that many had been taught tactics designed to
make the courts’ task of identifying racial discrimination in jury selection
more difficult.58 In response, the California legislature passed, and the Governor signed, a series of reforms aimed at limiting the reach of discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges.59 During floor debate, the bill’s
sponsors introduced studies on the racialized use of peremptory challenges
on capital juries in North Carolina to buttress support for the measure.60

evidentiary hearing on Batson issues, but not to prosecutorial wrongdoing. The defendant
in White was prosecuted by David Spence, who also prosecuted Russell Tucker.
55. Cf. State v. Ricks, 862 S.E.2d 835, at ¶ 9 (N.C. 2021) (reversing Court of Appeals’
decision to vacate trial court’s orders imposing satellite-based monitoring, concluding appellate court “abused its discretion when it allowed defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari
and invoked Rule 2 to reach the merits of defendant’s unpreserved challenge,” distinguishing
the case upon which the lower court had relied as “rest[ing] heavily upon the State’s concession that the trial court committed error,” and finding it notable that “[t]he State in the present
case . . . has made no such concession”).
56. See, e.g., cases discussed, supra note 42.
57. See, e.g., WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37 (2018) (codifying a judicially imposed rule by the
Washington Supreme Court that the party exercising a peremptory challenge must articulate
the reasons for the challenge, and “[i]f the court determines that an objective observer could
view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the peremptory
challenge shall be denied” and “[t]he court need not find purposeful discrimination to deny
the peremptory challenge”); Brenna Goth, Arizona Bans Use of Peremptory Strikes in State
Jury Trials, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 30, 2021, 7:01 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/uslaw-week/arizona-bans-use-of-peremptory-strikes-in-state-jury-trials [https://perma.cc/DC3
4-ZL6D] (“‘Eliminating peremptory strikes of jurors will reduce the opportunity for misuse
of the jury selection process and will improve jury participation and fairness,’ Chief Justice
Robert Brutinel said in a statement.”).
58. ELISABETH SEMEL ET AL., BERKELEY LAW DEATH PENALTY CLINIC, WHITEWASHING
THE JURY BOX: HOW CALIFORNIA PERPETUATES THE DISCRIMINATORY EXCLUSION OF BLACK
AND LATINX JURORS 49 (June 2020).
59. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231.7 (West 2021) (enumerating presumptively invalid
reasons for exercising a challenge and establishing that a court need not find purposeful discrimination to sustain an objection).
60. See Assemb. B. Analysis, AB-3070, at 3 (Cal. 2020).
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Despite the existence of such evidence and the attention that has been
brought to its disappointing Batson record,61 the type of legislative reform
that garnered support in California seems unlikely to occur in North Carolina, where officials who repealed the state’s Racial Justice Act continue to
control the General Assembly. In the courts, remands for an evidentiary
hearing generally remain the high-water mark for success.62 Many places
have struggled with fidelity to Batson, but perhaps none have done a worse
job than the Tar Heel state.63 Thirty-four years removed from the decision,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina observed that it had still “never held
that a prosecutor intentionally discriminated against a juror of color.”64 The
state has one of the higher percentages of Black residents in the country, but
nearly half of the 135 people on its death row were put there by all-white
juries or juries that included just one person of color.65
The failure of the courts to provide a remedy, even in instances in
which racial discrimination has been obvious from the record,66 has helped
cultivate a climate in North Carolina where something as dubious as a cheat
sheet can be defended as fair play by its highest law enforcement official.
Because of this, prosecutorial practices of jury discrimination will likely
endure even if the court grants Russell Tucker a new trial. A reversal of his
conviction on Batson grounds would be legally significant, but just as necessary is a change of culture among prosecutors, too many of whom see a
strategic advantage in the exercise of race-based challenges.67 The Conference of District Attorneys, a powerful and nebulous body created to

61. See, e.g., Daniel R. Pollitt & Brittany P. Warren, Thirty Years of Disappointment:
North Carolina’s Remarkable Appellate Batson Record, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1957 (2016).
62. See State v. Bennett, 843 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 2020); State v. Hobbs, 841 S.E.2d 492
(N.C. 2020).
63. See, e.g., Emily Coward, What Does It Take to Succeed on a Batson Claim in North
Carolina?, N.C. CRIM. L. (Feb. 18, 2020, 3:30 PM), https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/whatdoes-it-take-to-succeed-on-a-batson-claim-in-north-carolina/ [https://perma.cc/M3HT-9C5
W] (noting that “Alabama courts have reversed approximately 80 convictions on Batson
grounds” since the case was decided in 1986).
64. State v. Robinson, 846 S.E.2d 711, 716 (N.C. 2020).
65. Henderson Hill, Racist Roots: Origins of North Carolina’s Death Penalty, N.C.
POL’Y WATCH (Oct. 5, 2020), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2020/10/05/racist-roots-origi
ns-of-north-carolinas-death-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/K2T9-NTLN].
66. See, e.g., State v. White, 509 S.E.2d 462, 465–66 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) and discussion supra, note 50.
67. For a discussion of how North Carolina’s demographics function to incentivize the
exercise of race-based challenges and caution in favor of close judicial scrutiny in homicide
cases involving Black defendants, see generally infra, Part III, Section C.
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coordinate the interests of prosecutors,68 has signaled this change is unlikely
to come from them.69
As the official charged with representing the State in criminal appeals,
it is the Attorney General who ultimately bears the responsibility of demonstrating that there are limits to the conduct his office will defend. His office
can put the state on a different path, but it will require more than issuing
reports and lending his endorsement to bills supported by conservative lawmakers. In some cases, it will require stipulating to the need for post-conviction relief. As one superior court judge noted, racial discrimination in
North Carolina’s jury selection process remains “a significant problem that
will not be corrected without a conscious and overt commitment to
change.”70
III. THE COURT SHOULD CONFRONT TRIAL PROSECUTORS’ USE OF A
DEVICE DESIGNED TO CIRCUMVENT BATSON AND HOLD THAT IT
VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION
In recent terms, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has acknowledged the state’s dismal Batson record and remanded several cases for additional evidentiary hearings. In these cases, the court has expounded on
the Batson standard more than it has in the past and indicated that it is error
for trial courts to effectively fail to show their work.71 The court has emphasized that a prima facie showing of racial discrimination, at the initial
stage, “is not intended to be a high hurdle.”72 These developments could

68. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-411 (West 2021).
69. Weill-Greenberg, supra note 35 (“When asked if she thought there was an issue of
Black people being unfairly excluded from juries in North Carolina, [the organization’s director] replied, ’No, I don’t.’ ‘We teach the law and we teach appropriate application of the
law,’ she said. ‘We always have.’”).
70. Race and the Jury: Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, EQUAL JUSTICE
INITIATIVE (2021), https://eji.org/wp-content/uploads/2005/11/race-and-the-jury-digital.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XG27-27WW] (quoting Order Granting Mot. for Appropriate Relief at
115, ¶ 236, State v. Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143 (N.C. Super. Ct. Cumberland Cnty. Apr.
20, 2012)).
71. See, e.g., State v. Hobbs, 841 S.E.2d 492, 502–04 (N.C. 2020) (remanding case to
trial court for a Batson hearing and instructing it “to make findings of fact and conclusions
of law,” where “trial court did not explain how it weighed the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges, including the historical evidence . . . brought to [its] attention,” and rejecting argument from dissenting Justice that the
holding amounted to “a new legal standard”).
72. State v. Bennett, 843 S.E.2d 222, 234 (N.C. 2020); see also id. at 235–36 (holding
that a “careful review of the numerical disparity between the relative acceptance rates for
African American and white prospective jurors, coupled with other inferences that can be
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indicate that the court is moving closer towards the day when it is no longer
the only southern high court to have never reversed a conviction for jury
discrimination. In Tucker, the Office of the Attorney General, perhaps sensing the court’s newfound openness to scrutinizing the actions of trial prosecutors during voir dire, has devoted much of its attention to arguing that
consideration of the “Batson Justifications” document is procedurally
barred.73
Arguments that defendants are procedurally barred from raising claims
are a regular feature of the state’s criminal appellate docket. In another
recent capital case, State v. Allen, the court rejected the Attorney General’s
reading of the procedural bar rule, calling it “extra-textual,” and stating that,
if adopted, it “would . . . effectively prevent post-conviction review of all
claims” that were not preserved at trial.74 Russell Tucker’s contention that
his claims are not barred is supported by a growing body of law, discussed
below, that recognizes an exception to traditional bars for claims involving
racial discrimination and criminal juries. If the court rejects the State’s argument about the purported procedural bar, fidelity to Batson and the equal
protection doctrine, coupled with the scrutiny and enhanced procedural protections owed to capital defendants,75 should lead it to conclude that Tucker
is entitled to relief.
A. A Growing Body of Law Supports the Conclusion That Courts
Should Not Be Deemed Procedurally Barred from Considering
Evidence of Racial Discrimination in the Jury Selection Process
As a matter of public policy and institutional integrity, courts are increasingly resisting the invocation of procedural bars in cases that raise
credible evidence of state-based racial discrimination. This may reflect a
recognition that, historically, such bars have too often been employed to
avoid addressing issues of critical importance to racial justice, including
discrimination in jury selection.76 The U.S. Supreme Court recently
derived from the record,” leads to conclusion that defendant made a prima facie showing of
racial discrimination).
73. See, e.g., Brief for the State (Appellee) at 39, State v. Tucker, No. 113A96-4 (N.C.
Sept. 16, 2021), cert. granted, 856 S.E.2d 103 (N.C. 2021) (mem.).
74. State v. Allen, No. 115A04-3, slip op. at ¶ 60 (N.C. Aug. 13, 2021) (emphasis
added).
75. See generally Williams v. Lynaugh, 484 U.S. 935, 939 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117–18 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
76. See, e.g., Carrie Leonetti, Smoking Guns: The Supreme Court’s Willingness to
Lower Procedural Barriers to Merits Review in Cases Involving Egregious Racial Bias in
the Criminal Justice System, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 205, 210–11 (2017) (discussing the Court’s
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concluded that the necessity of addressing claims involving racial bias and
criminal juries outweighed the import of procedural rules that would have
otherwise barred their consideration.77 As its decision in Pena-Rodriguez
v. Colorado noted, many state appellate courts have also adopted race exceptions to rules that would otherwise bar consideration of such issues on
the merits.78 Pena-Rodriguez created a racial bias exception to the no-impeachment rule,79 which had previously been regarded as unassailable and
of much greater public policy import80 than the procedural bars the State
has asserted against Russell Tucker.81 North Carolina’s appellate courts
also recently held, and the Attorney General has previously stipulated, that
a judge’s “interjection of race . . . [into] the jury selection process” presents
“one of the narrow circumstances in which it is appropriate . . . to invoke

past “use of ‘analytic and regulatory techniques’ to segregate racial-bias challenges to criminal procedure from the rest of its equal protection jurisprudence” (quoting Karlan, supra
note 13, at 2002)); cf. Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudence of Denial and Evasion, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1307, 1311–14 (1991).
77. E.g., Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. 1, 21 (2017); Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct.
759, 780 (2017); Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016); see generally Leonetti,
supra note 76.
78. Pena-Rodriguez, 580 U.S. at 9. Examples include State v. Brown, 62 A.3d 1099,
1110 (R.I. 2013); Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 87–90 (Mo. 2010)
(en banc); State v. Hidanovic, 747 N.W.2d 463, 472–74 (N.D. 2008); State v. Santiago, 715
A.2d 1, 14–22 (Conn. 1998); Fisher v. State, 690 A.2d 917, 919–21 (Del. 1996); State v.
Jackson, 912 P.2d 71, 80–81 (Haw. 1996); State v. Hunter, 463 S.E.2d 314, 316 (S.C. 1995);
Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So.2d 354, 357–58 (Fla. 1995); Commonwealth v. Laguer,
571 N.E.2d 371, 376 (Mass. 1991); Spencer v. State, 398 S.E.2d 179, 184–85 (Ga. 1990);
People v. Rukaj, 506 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679–80 (1986); State v. Callender, 297 N.W.2d 744,
746 (Minn. 1980); Seattle v. Jackson, 425 P.2d 385, 389 (Wash. 1967); State v. Levitt, 176
A.2d 465, 467–68 (N.J. 1961).
79. The no-impeachment rule, which the Court recognized as “centuries old,” is designed “to give substantial protection to verdict finality and to assure jurors that, once their
verdict has been entered, it will not later be called into question based on the comments or
conclusions they expressed during deliberations.” Pena-Rodriguez, 580 U.S. at 2.
80. See, e.g., Cummings v. Ortega, 716 S.E.2d 235, 239 (N.C. 2011) (discussing the
“[p]olicy considerations [that] were critical to the [U.S. Supreme] Court’s decision in Tanner
v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987)],” in which the Court rejected the admissibility of
evidence that jurors consumed cocaine and alcohol during the trial to impeach their verdict).
81. The statute the State has invoked against Tucker recognizes a number of exceptions
to the procedural bar. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1419(b)(1)–(2) (West 2021) (providing that a defendant may overcome a procedural bar by showing either (1) “good cause” and
“actual prejudice” or (2) that procedurally barring the claim would result in a “fundamental
miscarriage of justice”).
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Rule 2,”82 a device that permits the suspension of the rules of appellate procedure “[t]o prevent manifest injustice to a party.”83
Pena-Rodriguez was one in a series of recent cases in which the U.S.
Supreme Court has granted relief to criminal defendants on account of the
pernicious influence of race in the criminal process and in spite of procedural and jurisdictional obstacles. In Buck v. Davis, the Court found that a
capital defendant made the rare showing of “extraordinary circumstances”
that warranted reopening his judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), and reversed a
lower court’s ruling that references to the defendant’s race “during the penalty phase w[ere] ‘de minimis’” in light of “the crime’s brutal nature and
[his] lack of remorse.”84 The Court reasoned the prejudice to the defendant
“was exacerbated because it concerned race,” which it said “‘poison[ed]
public confidence’ in the judicial process” that produced the sentence.85 In
Foster v. Chatman, the Court “overlook[ed] a possible jurisdictional barrier
to reaching the merits of [a] racial discrimination claim” before reversing a
Georgia court’s holding that prosecutors did not violate Batson during a defendant’s capital jury selection process.86
These cases have come as welcome developments to those concerned
about the continued influence of racial bias in the criminal process. Each
implicitly recognizes that the promise of equal justice rings hollow when
courts are presented with evidence of racial discrimination against a criminal defendant, and an opportunity to address it, but they fail to take remedial
action because of a procedural issue. Moreover, the decisions reflect the
operation of a new “constitutional rule that racial bias in the justice system
must be addressed . . . to prevent a systemic loss of confidence in jury verdicts[.]”87 This rule recognizes that jury service represents most people’s
closest connection to the criminal process,88 that it informs their understanding of it, and that the failure of courts to intervene when racial discrimination infects the proceedings risks undermining the legitimacy of the court
as an institution.

82. State v. Campbell, slip op. at ¶¶ 7, 10 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2021) (second quotation quoting State’s brief).
83. N.C. R. App. P. 2 (2021).
84. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 766–69 (2017).
85. Id. at 778 (quoting Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208 (2015)).
86. Leonetti, supra note 76, at 216 (discussing Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737,
1745–47 (2016)).
87. State v. Crump, 851 S.E.2d 904, 910–11 (N.C. 2020) (quoting Pena-Rodriguez v.
Colorado, 580 U.S. 1, 3 (2017)).
88. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (“[F]or most citizens the honor
and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic
process.”).
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Applying these principles to the facts of Tucker suggests the court
should not permit a procedural bar—if one exists at all89—to keep it from
addressing the issue of the Batson cheat sheet. That trial prosecutors were
intent on securing a death-qualified, all-white jury seems clear, and it undermines the ability to have confidence in both the jury’s impartiality and
the process that produced Tucker’s death sentence.90 The possibility that
prosecutors succeeded in keeping Black people off of his jury because of
deception directed towards the trial court itself is all the more reason for the
Supreme Court to reach the issue.91
Commentators have written that “[r]eviving the promise of Batson in
North Carolina . . . is a critical component of the appellate courts’ role in
safeguarding the integrity of the criminal justice system,”92 noting they have
reviewed more than one hundred cases raising claims of jury discrimination
under the Batson standard without once reversing a conviction.93 There are
some indications the court is aware of this criticism,94 and that it knows its
continued failure to act when presented with evidence of race-based challenges to jury service risks undermining public confidence95 in the system
and casting doubt on its own commitment “to adhere to the law.”96

89. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1419(b)(1)–(2) (West 2021) (detailing exceptions
to the procedural bar); see also State v. Burke, 843 S.E.2d 246, 248–49 (N.C. 2020) (concluding that “trial court erred in ruling that [a capital] defendant’s claims . . . were procedurally barred” because the “amended [Racial Justice Act], enacted in 2012, can only be applied
to defendant insofar as it affects the procedural aspects of the adjudication of his claims”).
90. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 134 (1994) (stating that the imperative of maintaining the “diverse and representative character of the jury” serves, among
other things, the critical purpose of providing “‘assurance of [the jury’s] diffused impartiality’”) (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1975)).
91. Cf. Deborah L. Rhode, Character in Criminal Justice Proceedings: Rethinking Its
Role in Rules Governing Evidence, Punishment, Prosecutors, and Parole, 45 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 353, 397 (2019) (“At a time when the Black Lives Matter movement has raised increasing
concerns about the fairness of law enforcement and criminal justice decision making, courts
should not tolerate practices that compound distrust and undermine the legitimacy of legal
processes.”).
92. James E. Coleman, Jr., The Persistence of Discrimination in Jury Selection: Lessons
from North Carolina and Beyond, THE CHAMPION (June 2018), https://www.nacdl.org/Article/June2018-ThePersistenceofDiscrimination [https://perma.cc/D32G-PR4T].
93. Coward, supra note 63.
94. See generally State v. Bennett, 843 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 2020); State v. Hobbs, 841
S.E.2d 492 (N.C. 2020) (discussed infra, Part III, Section B).
95. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49 (1992).
96. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991).
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B. The Equal Protection Doctrine Does Not Permit Prosecutors to
Employ Devices Designed to Undermine the Operation of
Mechanisms Imposed by Courts to Guard Against Racial
Discrimination
If it does reach the issue, the court should find that prosecutors do not
need the assistance of written aids to communicate with a court about their
own subjective motivations for a decision they made moments before. It
defies common sense to believe the cheat sheet was created to aid prosecutors in effecting the promise of Batson, when the obvious explanation is that
it was created to undermine that promise.97 As a matter of institutional integrity, the court should reject the State’s characterization of the document
as some kind of benign written reminder to prosecutors “that all peremptory
challenges should appropriately be based on non-racial reasons.”98 Accepting such a specious explanation would send “a message . . . that the exclusion of minority jurors is generally not going to be taken very seriously or
scrutinized very carefully.”99
97. See, e.g., Br. of Joseph DiGenova et al. as Amici Curiae Supp. Pet’r at 8, Foster v.
Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016) (No. 14-8349) (stating that N.C. Conference of D.A.s’
1995 “Top Gun II” course, where the cheat sheet was distributed, “train[ed] . . . prosecutors
to deceive judges as to their true motivations”). The State advanced a similarly dubious
argument in Mr. Tucker’s case when it asserted that “the reference to [people who like] ‘rap
music’ . . . in a short list which appears to be an outline of characteristics the prosecution
was seeking to avoid” in jurors somehow “refutes an allegation that indicates a motivation
to racially discriminate.” Answer to Successive M.A.R. & State’s Mot. for Summ. Denial
at 14, State v. Tucker, No. 94 CRS 40465 (N.C. Super. Ct. Forsyth Cnty. May 25, 2018); see
also Brief for the State (Appellee) at 46–47, State v. Tucker, No. 113A96-4 (N.C. Sept. 16,
2021), cert. granted, 856 S.E.2d 103 (N.C. 2021) (mem.). The facts of the case have nothing
to do with rap music, suggesting that prosecutors may have intended to ask questions about
rap music as a proxy for either assessing prospective jurors’ attitudes about Black people, to
prime jurors’ minds with stereotypical imagery of Black people, or both. See Justin D. Levinson, Race, Death, and the Complicitous Mind, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 631–32 (2009)
(discussing the “implicit association between the death penalty and race that becomes activated during the supposedly race-neutral death qualification process,” as well as studies that
show rap music can operate as a “racial stereotype prime[r]” and that “activating racial stereotypes at trial will likely affect juror decision making”); see generally Christine Reyna et
al., Blame it on Hip-Hop: Anti-Rap Attitudes as a Proxy for Prejudice, 12 GROUP PROCESSES
& INTERGROUP RELATIONS 361 (2009).
98. Answer to Successive M.A.R. and State’s Mot. For Summ. Denial at 13, State v.
Tucker, No. 94 CRS 40465 (N.C. Super. Ct. Forsyth Cnty. May 25, 2018).
99. Karlan, supra note 13, at 2023; see also Jackson v. Commonwealth, 380 S.E.2d 1,
6 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (“Rubber stamp approval of all nonracial explanations will not satisfy
the command of Batson. . . . If this were sufficient, the Batson inquiry would amount to little
more than a charade.”); Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 318 (2007) (“Toleration of
intentional misconduct is inconsistent with Batson’s basic premises.”).
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Until a pair of recent opinions, State v. Bennett and State v. Hobbs,100
this was the general lesson most people took from the case law in North
Carolina. In contrast to the other southern states, each of whose appellate
courts have long made some effort to police the issue, North Carolina’s
highest court “has never held that a prosecutor intentionally discriminated
against a juror of color.”101 Remands in Bennett and Hobbs signaled the
court’s attentiveness to the inadequacy of Batson enforcement in North Carolina, but prior to those decisions, there was little a trial attorney could direct a judge to as evidence that appellate courts would apply scrutiny to a
suspicious juror challenge.
In capital cases, the consequences for many defendants were dramatic,
as exemplified by the facts in Tucker. For at least twenty years, and likely
many more, state prosecutors in capital trials “struck eligible black venire
members at about 2.5 times the rate they struck eligible venire members
who were not black”—a disparity that endured well into the 2000s and after
the passage of the now-repealed Racial Justice Act.102 While the Supreme
Court has since begun to grapple with “Batson’s ineffectiveness in this
state,”103 the North Carolina Conference of District Attorneys has not. Its
position continues to be that “Black people being unfairly excluded from
juries in North Carolina” is not a problem and that it has never encouraged
prosecutors to circumvent Batson.104
Even in those jurisdictions where Batson has been given real effect,
large scale surveys of its application demonstrate “that in almost any situation a prosecutor can readily craft an acceptable neutral explanation to justify striking black jurors because of their race.”105 In other words, Batson

100. State v. Bennett, 843 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 2020); State v. Hobbs, 841 S.E.2d 492 (N.C.
2020).
101. State v. Robinson, 846 S.E.2d 711, 716 (N.C. 2020); see also Pollitt & Warren, supra note 61.
102. Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming
Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital Trials, 97
IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1533–34 (2012).
103. Robinson, 846 S.E.2d at 716.
104. See Weill-Greenberg, supra note 35.
105. Michael J. Raphael & Edward Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations
Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 229, 236 (1993); see also Lonnie T.
Brown, Jr., Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: Professional Misconduct, Not Legitimate Advocacy, 22 REV. LITIG. 209, 213 (2003) (“[N]otwithstanding its necessity and propriety, the Court’s ban on the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges has, in practice,
been decidedly ineffective in achieving its original goals”); Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in
Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 447, 459 (1996) (“The number of prosecutors who have been determined to
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is already a somewhat poor match for remedying the discrimination that
actually occurs.106 The case stands no chance of doing the work it was intended to do if prosecutors understand there will be no penalty for circumventing the process it prescribes.107
In Tucker’s case, this act of circumvention—reading from the cheat
sheet when asked for a non-racial explanation for the exercise of peremptory challenges108—distorted the court’s ability to identify the discrimination that was occurring.109 Cases like People v. Morant and, more famously,
Miller-El v. Dretke, have considered—and held unlawful—prosecutors’
surreptitious reliance on materials during voir dire that emphasized race as
a reason for the exercise of peremptory strikes.110 However, no appellate
courts appear to have considered materials quite like the document at issue
in North Carolina. One of the only trial courts to have done so referred to
it as a “cheat sheet” and said it, along with the corresponding pattern of

have acted in violation of the law as set down in Batson is a dismal report card on this particular aspect of this obligation.”).
106. People v. Bolling, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1145 (N.Y. 1992) (Bellacosa, J., concurring)
(“Unfortunately, the Batson procedural hurdles have become ‘less obstacles to racial discrimination than they are road maps’ to disguised discrimination.” (citation omitted)).
107. See, e.g., Gilad Edelman, Why Is It So Easy for Prosecutors to Strike Black Jurors?,
NEW YORKER (June 5, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-is-it-so-ea
sy-for-prosecutors-to-strike-black-jurors [https://perma.cc/D793-7ETN]. (“[Justice] Marshall’s skepticism was quickly vindicated. As soon as Batson was decided, prosecutors
started coming up with tactics to evade it. . . . A consensus soon formed that the Batson
remedy was toothless. In a 1996 opinion, an Illinois appellate judge, exasperated by ‘the
charade that has become the Batson process,’ catalogued some of the flimsy reasons for
striking jurors that judges had accepted as ‘race-neutral’. . . . The judge joked, ‘[n]ew prosecutors are given a manual, probably entitled, “Handy Race-Neutral Explanations” or “20
Time-Tested Race-Neutral Explanations.”‘ As it turns out, that really happens.”).
108. Brief for the State (Appellee) at 39, State v. Tucker, No. 113A96-4 (N.C. Sept. 16,
2021), cert. granted, 856 S.E.2d 103 (N.C. 2021) (mem.) (acknowledging that “it may be
true that the prosecutors in this case articulated some justifications similar to the ‘Top Gun’
[Batson Justifications] training document as part of their rationale for particular juror
strikes”).
109. David Spence, who prosecuted Russell Tucker and is now a prosecutor in the eastern
part of the state, has repeatedly declined opportunities to dispute this characterization and to
offer an alternative explanation. See, e.g., Michael Hewlett, Motion: Prosecutors Used Race
in Jury Selection in Winston-Salem Murder Trial Involving Killing of Kmart Security Guard,
WINSTON-SALEM J. (July 30, 2018), https://journalnow.com/news/crime/motion-prosecutors
-used-race-in-jury-selection-in-winston-salem-murder-trial-involving-killing-of/article_07f7d0e-547b-5582-ada7-452a9428de65.html [https://perma.cc/NSG5-SM27].
110. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266 (2005); People v. Morant, No. 4904/1995,
slip op. at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 10, 2020).
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strikes, amounted to “convincing evidence” of a prosecutor’s “calculated
. . . effort to circumvent Batson.”111
Whether the Supreme Court of North Carolina will reach a similar conclusion in Russell Tucker’s case remains to be determined. It would seem,
for a number of reasons, that a defendant who can show the document was
used in his or her case has established a violation of their own and excluded
jurors’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause
and its analog in Article I, Section 19 of the N.C. Constitution.112 A prosecutor who recites a justification written before an interaction with a challenged juror is likely misrepresenting the true reason for having made the
strike,113 something that lends “support [to] a claim that a prosecutor’s peremptory strikes were made on the basis of race.”114
In the civil rights context, courts have long rejected, as violative of
equal protection, attempts by government officials to undermine the effect
of court decisions, laws, rules, and consent decrees that affirm the right to
be free of racial discrimination.115 In Hibbs v. Winn, for example, the U.S.
Supreme Court observed that federal courts properly intervened for decades
to enjoin officials’ efforts to fashion “tuition grants and tax credits . . . to
circumvent Brown v. Board of Education,” its landmark decision prohibiting racial segregation in public schools.116 In the voting rights context, the
Court has held that municipalities cannot “circumvent the preclearance requirement [of the Voting Rights Act] . . . by annexing vacant land intended
for white developments,” because to do so “would . . . ‘have the effect of
denying citizens their right to vote because of their race.’”117 Even before

111. State v. Golphin, No. 97 CRS 47314-15, at 73–77 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012)
(order granting mots. for appropriate relief).
112. Racially-based strikes of jurors cause constitutional injury to both the defendant and
the excluded jurors. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994); Carter v. Jury
Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970). They also violate Article I, section 26 of the North
Carolina Constitution, which prohibits “exclu[sion] from jury service on account of . . .
race.” N.C. CONST. art. I, § 26; see generally State v. Hood, 848 S.E.2d 515, 520 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2020).
113. See generally Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9, 36 (1997).
114. State v. Hobbs, 841 S.E.2d 492, 501 (N.C. 2020) (quoting Flowers v. Mississippi,
139 S. Ct. 2228, 2243 (2019)).
115. See, e.g., Alexander v. Chattahoochee Valley Cmty. Coll., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1274,
1281–83 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (holding that a Black community college clerk stated a prima
facie case of race discrimination when the school followed a procedure that appeared to be
designed to circumvent hiring practices mandated by an earlier consent decree).
116. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 93 (2004).
117. City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 468 (1987) (quoting Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969)). As of the date of this publication, section
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it embraced a more modern conception of civil rights in the 1960s, the
Court, in a series of cases spanning from the 1920s to 1950s, found an
“anti-circumvention norm justified abrogating the First Amendment rights”
of private associations that states had employed “to circumvent the protections of the Fourteenth . . . Amendment.”118
This anti-discrimination, anti-circumvention norm applies with equal
force in criminal cases. The equal protection clause, from which it comes,
“reach[es] every exercise of state authority.”119 Instances of officials failing
to abide by rules or orders intended to identify state-based racial discrimination may arise less-frequently in the criminal context, but they do exist.120
Tucker presents one of the clearer examples of the phenomenon by way of
prosecutors’ misrepresentation of their motives for exercising peremptory
strikes.
These misrepresentations are especially prejudicial in a capital case,
which is “qualitatively different” and requires the use of practices calculated
to produce reliable results.121 North Carolina’s recent history is replete with
cases that give reason to doubt the reliability of its system for administering
the death penalty. Twelve people have been exonerated and released from
state’s death row, all but one of them Black.122 They include Henry

Five’s preclearance requirement remains the law, but it is unenforceable following the
Court’s holding in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), that the coverage formula
adopted by Congress during the Voting Rights Act’s last reauthorization was not responsive
to current conditions.
118. Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89
WASH. L. REV. 379, 429 (2014) (discussing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), overruled in part
by Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); and Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927)).
119. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996) (reviewing the propriety of a court order that prosecutors refused to comply with, which granted discovery to
criminal defendants who alleged that they were singled out for prosecution due to their race);
see also FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., SUSPECT CITIZENS: WHAT 20 MILLION TRAFFIC
STOPS TELL US ABOUT POLICING AND RACE 1–2 (2018) (recounting the trial of Carlos Riley
Jr., who was acquitted in 2015 of shooting a Durham police officer, and observing that “the
jury likely concluded that [the officer] had conducted a legally suspect search following a
racial profiling incident” and that the defense introduced evidence of the officer’s failure to
record traffic stops in a police database used to identify racially discriminatory stop and
search practices).
121. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
122. Elizabeth Hambourger, Virginia Just Abolished its Deeply Racist Death Penalty;
North Carolina Must Follow Suit, N.C. POLICY WATCH (Apr. 1, 2021), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2021/04/01/virginia-just-abolished-its-deeply-racist-death-penalty-north-carolina-must-follow-suit/ [https://perma.cc/UT48-RMTP].
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McCollum, whose conviction was upheld by both the North Carolina and
United States Supreme Courts,123 and who was once “held out, to the collective members of the Supreme Court, as the very worst of the worst.”124
Even after DNA evidence proved McCollum’s innocence and identified the
actual killer, the District Attorney who charged him, Joe Freeman Britt, refused to acknowledge his error and criticized the state’s failure to execute
him.125 Britt’s unrivaled ability to obtain death sentences, likely aided by
state courts’ lax approach to Batson,126 earned him the title of “America’s

123. State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144, 164 (N.C. 1993); McCollum v. North Carolina,
512 U.S. 1254, 1254 (1994), denying cert. to State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144 (N.C.
1993); see also Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (order denying cert.) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (discussing the McCollum case). As McCollum illustrates, the risk of executing an innocent person is very real. In 2015, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul
Stevens said that one of his former clerks had convinced him “beyond a shadow of doubt”
that Texas had executed an innocent man, 27-year-old Carlos DeLuna. See Columbia Law
News, Professor James Liebman Proves Innocent Man Executed, Retired Supreme Court
Justice Says, COLUMBIA L. SCH. (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/archive/professor-james-liebman-proves-innocent-man-executed-retired-supreme-court-justice-says [https://perma.cc/U9DL-7EGS]; see generally THE PHANTOM (Oxford Films 2021)
(documentary about the DeLuna case). It has become clear that, in some instances, prosecutors’ zeal to win in death penalty cases has eclipsed their sense of responsibility to do
justice. The Supreme Court of Arizona, for example, disbarred a capital prosecutor for using
false testimony to obtain multiple convictions and death sentences, a decision that came only
after the prosecutor had “conducted approximately sixty death penalty trials,” “won national
awards[,] and twice won the Arizona prosecutor-of-the-year award while being ‘personally
responsible for a tenth of the prisoners on Arizona’s death row.’” Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier et
al., Vigilante Justice: Prosecutor Misconduct in Capital Cases, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1327,
1363 (2009) (quoting Jeffrey Toobin, Killer Instincts, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 9, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/01/17/killer-instincts [https://perma.cc/6AH3D9AT]).
124. Michael L. Perlin, ”Merchants and Thieves, Hungry for Power”: Prosecutorial
Misconduct and Passive Judicial Complicity in Death Penalty Trials of Defendants with
Mental Disabilities, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1513–16 (2016) (quoting Dahlia
Lithwick, A Horrifying Miscarriage of Justice in North Carolina, SLATE (Sept. 5, 2014),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/09/henry-lee-mccollum-cleared-by-dna-evidencein-north-carolina-after-spending-30-years-on-death-row.html [https://perma.cc/NK5M-C2
KK]).
125. See generally Richard A. Oppel, Jr., As Two Men Go Free, a Dogged Ex-Prosecutor
Digs In, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/08/us/as-2-go-freejoe-freeman-britt-a-dogged-ex-prosecutor-digs-in.html [https://perma.cc/BR3A-FJ5M].
126. See, e.g., McCollum, 433 S.E.2d at 159 (finding no error when the “trial court . . .
concluded that a Batson violation had occurred” when the prosecutor struck three Black jurors because of their race but then denied a defense motion to seat the jurors and instead
opted to begin the selection process anew).
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Deadliest Prosecutor” from the Guinness Book of World Records.127 He sat
on the Executive Committee of the N.C. Conference of District Attorneys,
the group which organized the “Top Gun II” training at which the cheat
sheet was distributed,128 and a body that has resisted inquiry into jury discrimination in capital cases and quietly opposed the assignment of Black
judges to hear such claims.129
The Attorney General’s decision to align his office with the Conference in resisting such inquiries suggests hard medicine may be necessary to
end the abuse of peremptory challenges in the state. The remedy for state
action that has undermined a defendant’s right to a jury selection process
free of racial discrimination is to vacate the conviction. On four occasions
since 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court has reversed murder convictions because of trial courts’ failure to abide by Batson.130 Three of the cases involved prisoners, like Tucker, who had been sentenced to death. In each
case, the defendants had to overcome the doubly-deferential standard that
applies in federal habeas proceedings.131 That each managed to prevail reflects the weight the Court accords to the constitutional prohibition on
race-based peremptory challenges. Although the cheat sheet may represent
a new spin on the traditional Batson appeal, these cases suggest the Supreme
Court of North Carolina should award Russell Tucker a new trial, one free

127. Alan Blinder, Joe Freeman Britt, Called America’s ‘Deadliest D.A.,’ Dies at 80,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/us/joe-freeman-britt-cal
led-americas-deadliest-da-dies-at-80.html [https://perma.cc/S8P4-PMNN].
128. Tonya Maxwell, Black Juror’s Dismissal, Death Penalty Revisited in Double Homicide, CITIZEN-TIMES (Nov. 3, 2016, 5:26 PM), https://www.citizen-times.com/story/news/lo
cal/2016/11/03/black-jurors-dismissal-death-penalty-revisited-double-homicide/93168824/
[https://perma.cc/3ECW-LZBJ].
129. See, e.g., Defendant-Appellant’s Brief at App. 286, State v. Golphin, 847 S.E.2d 400
(N.C. 2020) (No. 441A98-4) (discussing message to the Conference’s Executive Director
from an A.D.A. in Forsyth County who “suggested there may be a judicial standards complaint” filed if a Black judge chose to appoint another Black judge to hear a Racial Justice
Act claim); see also E-mail from Seth Edwards, Dist. Att’y, 2nd Prosecutorial Dist. of N.C.,
to William R. West, Dist. Att’y, 14th Prosecutorial Dist. of N.C., and Peg Dorer, Director,
N.C. Conf. of Dist. Att’ys (Nov. 3, 2011, 10:10 AM) (quoting former Conference President
statement to Executive Director that Judge Sumner would be his choice “[i]f I had to pick an
African American to hear an RJA motion”).
130. Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019); Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488
(2016); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
131. See, e.g., Messiah v. Duncan, 435 F.3d 186, 196–98 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that
pursuant to Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), appellate courts “afford ‘great
deference’ to the state court’s credibility assessment of a prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral
explanation for striking a juror,” and that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 “reconfigured [the] standard of review in habeas cases . . . by requiring ‘more deferential’ review” (citations omitted)).
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of racial discrimination, and hold that the attempt to undermine the operation of Batson by prosecutors will compromise any ensuing conviction.
C. In North Carolina, Unique Considerations Regarding the
Adjudication of Homicide Cases Involving Black Defendants
Suggest That Courts Should Closely Scrutinize Claims of Racial
Discrimination in the Jury Selection Process
Although post-conviction relief in a capital case comes at the expense
of considerable prosecutorial resources, there is a strong public interest in
having instances of racial discrimination in jury selection, including the
kind of practices that were employed in Tucker’s case, declared to be unacceptable.132 Recognizing this, officials in other jurisdictions, rather than
fighting to preserve a conviction, have agreed in some cases to stipulate
“that [a] Defendant is entitled to a new trial due to the State’s use of peremptory strikes against African-American prospective jurors”133 or because
a prosecutor made false or misleading statements during their trial.134
This has not occurred in North Carolina, and there is no indication that
it will, given the state’s fraught political climate and the divisive politics
surrounding the death penalty.135 Yet, courts’ and prosecutors’ adherence
to Batson during the 1990s and early 2000s are known to have been particularly poor,136 heightening the need for courts to apply close scrutiny to
132. See, e.g., State v. Ramseur, 843 S.E.2d 106, 117 (N.C. 2020) (“[T]he harm from
racial discrimination in criminal cases is not limited to an individual defendant, but rather it
undermines the integrity of our judicial system.”); Kirchmeier et al., supra note 123, at 1353
(“[S]tudies . . . indicate [that] the potential for an unethical prosecutor to commit misconduct
by striking jurors for prohibited reasons while concealing that intent with neutral reasons is
significant.”); Melilli, supra note 105, at 501 (“[T]he exclusion from jury service because of
group stereotyping . . . makes underrepresented groups less accepting of the court system
and its results[ ] and injures society as a whole by frustrating the ideal of equal citizen participation in the jury process.”).
133. See, e.g., State’s Stipulations in Response to Defendant’s Presentation of Evidence
of Discrimination in Jury Selection on Remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court at 2, State
v. Williams, No. 508-604 E (La. Crim. Dist. Ct. June 15, 2017).
134. See, e.g., PHILA. DIST. ATTY’S OFF., OVERTURNING CONVICTIONS—AND AN ERA:
CONVICTION INTEGRITY UNIT REPORT 10 (June 2021) (reporting that the Philadelphia D.A.’s
office recently worked to exonerate and secure the release of four prisoners who were convicted in cases in which prosecutors made false statements in court).
135. Cf. Jason Zengerle, Is North Carolina the Future of American Politics?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (June 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/magazine/is-north-carolina-th
e-future-of-american-politics.html [https://perma.cc/Y8FR-NM9Q] (“Welcome to North
Carolina . . . where all the passions and pathologies of American politics writ large are
played out writ small—and with even more intensity.”).
136. See generally State v. Robinson, 846 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 2020); Pollitt & Warren,
supra note 6161; Weill-Greenberg, supra note 35.
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capital cases that advance credible claims of racial discrimination. In
Tucker’s case, the Attorney General may have chosen to take trial prosecutors at their word that race was not in play, but the circumstances strongly
suggest otherwise.
Regrettably, some prosecutors recognize that, as an empirical matter,
race-based peremptory challenges “are strategically rational[,]”137 and they
have pursued them for that reason—another factor militating for judicial
vigilance. North Carolina data sets indicate that, “for every peremptory
challenge that [a] prosecutor used, the conviction rate for black male defendants increased by 2–4%.”138 The state’s demographics happen to be
such that, “when the defendant is black, challenges by state prosecutors
have an especially large positive impact on the conviction rate.”139
CONCLUSION
Not long ago, the N.C. Office of the Attorney General appealed to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina to permit the execution of Black and minority criminal defendants whom a lower court concluded were subjected
to racial discrimination in their jury selection process.140 In doing so, a Senior Deputy Attorney General, who Stein later appointed to oversee all criminal appeals in the state,141 accused the Black superior court judge in
Fayetteville, who entered the order, of being biased in favor of the

137. Ronald F. Wright et al., The Jury Sunshine Project: Jury Selection Data as a Political Issue, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1407, 1431 (2018); cf. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence
and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1621–22 (1985) (observing that when Baltimore
switched “from a juror selection method that yielded at least 70% white jurors to one that
yielded between 34% and 47% black jurors, the jury trial conviction rate dropped from almost 84% to less than 70%[,]” and that a similar phenomenon occurred in Los Angeles).
138. Wright et al., supra note 137, at 1431 (citing Francis X. Flanagan, Race, Gender,
and Juries: Evidence from North Carolina, 61 J. L. & ECON. 189, 206–11 (2018)).
139. Flanagan, supra note 138, at 212.
140. Paul Woolverton, N.C. Supreme Court Justices Hear Arguments About Racial Justice Act Used in Fayetteville Cases, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (Apr. 14, 2014), https://w
ww.fayobserver.com/article/20140414/News/304149767 [https://perma.cc/H8NJ-MEYS].
Josh Stein would not be elected as Attorney General for two more years after this argument
was heard.
141. The North Carolina Attorney General’s Office does not make its organizational chart
available online. However, according to a federal lawsuit accusing the deputy, Alana Danielle Marquis Elder, of racial discrimination in employment practices, filed in September
2021 by a Special Deputy Attorney General and nineteen-year veteran of the department,
Stein appointed Elder in 2018 to lead the criminal division and to oversee all criminal appeals
and post-conviction litigation. Complaint at 3–28, ¶¶ 8, 110, Calloway-Durham v. N.C.
Dep’t of Just., No. 5:21-CV-00371-BO (E.D.N.C. Sept. 15, 2021).
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defendants.142 In each case, the judge had commuted the defendants’ sentences to life “primarily based on the words and deeds of the prosecutors
themselves.”143
In Russell Tucker’s case, the office has argued that a procedural bar
precludes the court from reaching the issue of whether a cheat sheet was
employed by prosecutors to subvert Batson and obtain the all-white jury
that sentenced him to death. This argument comes in the wake of the Attorney General’s recent condemnation of “covert . . . practices of discriminatory exclusion” in jury selection144 —an apt description for prosecutors’
use of the document. While the state cannot be faulted for regarding the
preservation of a homicide conviction as among its highest executive priorities, the preservation of defendants’ constitutional right to trials and sentences untainted by racial discrimination should always take precedence.
North Carolina is still reconciling how to honor this responsibility, particularly for those who have been convicted. The state’s high court ultimately determined that the defendants granted relief by the superior court
in Fayetteville were entitled to maintain their life sentences. Some advocates have read those cases to suggest that North Carolina’s appellate courts
are prepared to take Batson more seriously than they traditionally have, although those cases were resolved on double jeopardy grounds and not Batson.145
Tucker, however, presents the court with an opportunity to do something it has never done: to find that the State engaged in improper race-based
strikes of Black jurors.146 Given the strong evidence of pretext and the resulting jury, such a finding would be appropriate based on the facts. It
would also communicate a message to trial courts and attorneys, which the
evidence suggests many need to receive, that the right to a constitutionally-drawn jury will be enforced, with close scrutiny applied in capital

142. Woolverton, supra note 140.
143. Id. (quoting defense attorney Jay Ferguson, who characterized the court’s order);
see also Dax-Devlon Ross, Bias in the Box, VA. Q. REV. (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.vqr
online.org/reporting-articles/2014/10/bias-box [https://perma.cc/DM27-8AW4] (observing
that the judge endured heated “criticism from legislators, law enforcement, prosecutors, and
victims’ rights groups, some of whom detested . . . [him] for giving [the law] credence”).
144. N.C. TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 100.
145. See generally State v. Robinson, 846 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 2020); State v. Walters, 847
S.E.2d 399 (N.C. 2020); State v. Golphin, 847 S.E.2d 887 (N.C. 2020); State v. Augustine,
847 S.E.2d 729 (N.C. 2020).
146. See Robinson, 846 S.E.2d at 717 n.6 (“Although this Court ultimately remanded
[State v. Hobbs, 841 S.E.2d 492 (N.C. 2020) and State v. Bennett, 843 S.E.2d 222 (N.C.
2020)] for a new Batson hearing, we did not find that the State intentionally discriminated
against a juror in violation of Batson.”).
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cases, and that the appellate courts will not hesitate to take action when the
State has sought to evade its obligations under Batson.
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